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Abstract 
Since China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001, China’s utilisation of grain TRQs 
(tariff-rate quotas) has been very low, being only about 12 per cent on average during 
2002-08. This is in sharp contrast to anticipations of many analysts who believed that 
China’s grain imports would grow significantly after its WTO accession. This paper 
examines China’s management of grain TRQs and analyses why the grain TRQ utilisation 
is low. Our study shows that the primary cause for the low utilisation of the TRQ has been 
due to comfortable domestic supply situations, thanks to policies promoting domestic 
supply. Whether China’s grain TRQ usage will increase and how its grain trade policy 
will evolve in the future will continue to be affected by domestic grain supply and 
demand, and also by the outcomes of bilateral and multilateral free trade negotiations. 
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1. Introduction 
In December 2001, China was accepted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Many 
anticipated that, following China’s accession to the WTO, its grain imports would 
increase rapidly. To mitigate the likely strong shock on Chinese grain producers’ income 
and its grains industry, China was allowed a ‘transition period’ of a few years. During this 
transition period, China’s grain imports would be managed under a TRQ (tariff-rate 
quota) arrangement. That is, if the imports are within the quota, a lower in-quote tariff will 
be charged; otherwise, a much higher out-quote tariff applies. The higher above-quota 
tariff would discourage imports and thus would provide protection to Chinese farmers and 
its grains industry. 
Almost sever years have passed since China became a member of the WTO. Then, what 
has happened to China’s grain trade under the TRQ arrangement? How did China 
implement the grains TRQ? Were China’s TRQ practices in alignment with WTO rules? 
Such questions have continuously drawn much interest from grain traders and many 
international observers. Australia, as a major grain exporter, has also paid much attention 
to look for answers to such questions.[1] So far, however, little effort has been made to 
examine China’s grain TRQ implementation and management. This study attempts to fill 
this gap. 
In the next section, we first provide an overview over the developments in China’s grain 
trade and its trade policies since 2001. This is important because an understanding of 
China’s grain TRQ practice must be placed in the broader context of issues that affect 
China’s grain imports and grain trade policies. In Section 3, we highlight China’s grain 
TRQ implementation and management. Section 4 is devoted to examine the factors that 
affect China’s grain TRQ utilisation and explain why China’s grain TRQ utilisation is 
low. Section 5 discusses the prospects of China’s grain TRQ practices as well as the likely 
trade policy developments. The last section concludes the paper. 
2. Developments of China’s Grain Trade and Trade 
Policies since 2001 
2.1 Grain Trade 
Since 2001, China’s grain trade (not including soybean) followed no clear pattern.[2] The 
amount of imports, exports as well as net imports changed between years, and often 
abruptly (see Table 1). If soybean is included, total grain imports show a trend of 
increasing while total grain exports tend to change between years.   
Table 1. China’s Grain Trade, 1990-2007 (’000 t) 
Part A: Imports 
  Imports by Crops Total Imports 
  Wheat Rice Barley Corn Soybean Without Soybean With Soybean
1990 12527 59 652 369 31 13693 13724 
1991 12370 140 764 1 1 13449 13450 
1992 10581 104 829 0 121 11625 11746 
1993 6420 100 774 0 99 7422 7521 
1994 7300 520 1318 1 52 9148 9200 
1995 11590 2000 1274 5181 1744 20516 22260 
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1996 8250 760 1308 440 2988 11122 14110 
1997 1860 359 1800 3 6260 4170 10430 
1998 1490 240 1520 250 3200 3880 7080 
1999 450 170 2270 0 4890 3390 8280 
2000 880 240 1970 0 10930 3150 14080 
2001 690 270 2370 0 13990 3440 17430 
2002 600 240 1910 8 11321 2849 14170 
2003 430 371 1360 1 20742 2191 22933 
2004 7260 770 1710 0 20230 9750 29980 
2005 3538 522 2179 4 26591 6272 32863 
2006 613 730 2140 65 28270 3548 31818 
2007 101 487 913 35 30821 1536 32357 
2008 (1-9) 9 248 933 17 28695 1232 29928 
Part B: Exports 
  Exports by Crops Total Exports 
  Wheat Rice Barley Corn Soybean Without Soybean With Soybean
1990 7 326 0 3404 940 5311 6251 
1991 0 690 0 7780 1196 10860 12056 
1992 3 953 1 10314 658 12983 13641 
1993 291 1430 0 11100 730 14620 15350 
1994 268 1520 0 8740 1980 13050 15030 
1995 225 50 0 115 298 1842 2140 
1996 565 270 0 160 260 1790 2050 
1997 458 940 0 6610 210 8920 9130 
1998 270 3750 0 4690 170 9360 9530 
1999 164 2710 10 4310 200 8190 8390 
2000 188 2950 0 10470 210 14350 14560 
2001 713 1860 0 6000 250 9480 9730 
2002 699 1990 0 11670 280 15680 15960 
2003 2514 2610 0 16391 270 24103 24373 
2004 1089 910 0 2320 330 4730 5060 
2005 605 686 4 8642 413 9761 10175 
2006 1509 1253 6 3099 395 5867 6262 
2007 3073 1343 118 4918 475 9452 9927 
2008 (1-9) 272 827 8 187 376 1544 1920 
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Part C: Net Imports 
  Net Imports by Crops Total Net Imports 
  Wheat Rice Barley Corn Soybean Without Soybean With Soybean
1990 12520 -267 652 -3035 -909 8382 7473 
1991 12370 -550 764 -7779 -1195 2589 2590 
1992 10578 -849 828 -10314 -537 -1358 -1895 
1993 6129 -1330 774 -11100 -631 -7198 -7829 
1994 7032 -1000 1318 -8739 -1928 -3902 -5830 
1995 11365 1950 1274 5066 1446 18674 20120 
1996 7685 490 1308 280 2728 9332 12060 
1997 1402 -581 1800 -6607 6050 -4750 1300 
1998 1220 -3510 1520 -4440 3030 -5480 -2450 
1999 286 -2540 2260 -4310 4690 -4800 -110 
2000 692 -2710 1970 -10470 10720 -11200 -480 
2001 -23 -1590 2370 -6000 13740 -6040 7700 
2002 -99 -1750 1910 -11662 11041 -12831 -1790 
2003 -2084 -2239 1360 -16390 20472 -21912 -1440 
2004 6171 -140 1710 -2320 19900 5020 24920 
2005 2934 -164 2176 -8638 26177 -3489 22688 
2006 -896 -523 2134 -3034 27875 -2319 25556 
2007 -2972 -856 795 -4883 30346 -7916 22430 
2008 (1-9) -264 -580 925 -170 28319 -312 28007 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Monthly Bulletin of Chinese Agricultural Import and 
Export Statistics. 
At the crop level, while the level of soybean export has been stagnant, its import has 
increased rapidly in the past few years (see Parts A and B of Table 1). Soybean imports 
account for a major proportion of China’s total grain imports; around 80-90 per cent. 
China’s barley trade is one way: it imports a relatively large amount of high quality barley 
chiefly for brewing purposes. China was able to net export a significant amount of corn 
even after joining the WTO. However, the level of export has declined rapidly in the 
recent years. China has been a net rice exporter but its export level has dropped since 
2003 (see Part C of Table 1). Over the past seven years, China’s wheat trade has been 
most erratic. In 2002, the first year after China’s joining the WTO, China was a net wheat 
exporter although the volume was small. The net wheat export in the following year, 
2003, however, was significant, being over 2 mt. This was followed by a dramatic net 
wheat import increase in 2004 to be about 6.5 mt. It dropped to about 3 mt in 2005. In 
2006, China was again net-exporting wheat to the world market (Part C of Table 1).  
Comparing with the trade level before WTO accession, China’s total grain trade (both 
imports and exports) since 2001 has increased (see Figure 1). During 1990-2007, the 
annual growth rate of grain trade was about 4 per cent. Prior to the accession, namely, 
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1990-2001, the growth rate was 2.8 per cent with an annual average trade volume being 
22 mt. Since 2001, the growth rate has jumped to about 7 per cent with an annual average 
trade volume being about 38 mt.  
Figure 1. Changes in the Level of China’s Grain Trade before and after WTO 
Accession 
   
 
 
    
  
  
   
 
Source: Based on Table 1.  
There have also been noticeable changes in the composition of grain imports after WTO 
accession. Excluding soybean, the proportion of wheat import has increased, from 22 per 
cent in 1999-2001 to 38 per cent in 2005-07 (Figure 2). The proportion of rice import has 
also increased. On the other hand, the proportion of barley import out of total grain 
imports has declined, from 71 per cent to 46 per cent. The change in the proportion of 
corn is relatively small. The three-year average annual grain import during 2005-2007 (3.8 
mt, not including soybean) has only slightly increased compared to that of 1999-2001 (3.1 
mt). However, the three-year average annual imports during other years were much 
higher, for example, being more than double that of 1999-2001 during 2004-2006 (6.5 
mt).   
The discussion above shows that China’s total grain trade and grain net imports have 
increased after WTO accession. Thus, to some extent, China’s accession to the WTO may 
have led to increased grain trade between China and the rest of the world. However, seven 
years is relatively a short time and to what extent China’s increased grain trade and net 
imports can be attributed to WTO accession requires further research. In this regard, two 
issues are worth particular mention: the sharp increase in soybean import and China’s 
pragmatic approach to grain trade. A brief account on each follows.   
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Figure 2. Changes in the Composition of China’s Grain Trade (excluding Soybean)  
 
Average annual import: 3.1 million tonnes during 1999-2001. 
Average annual import: 3.8 million tonnes during 2005-2007. 
  
Source: Based on Table 1.  
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Table 1 clearly shows that China’s recent grain imports are mainly due to the fast increase 
in soybean imports. On average, soybean imports account for over 80 per cent of total 
grain imports during 2002-07. Excluding soybean, China’s total grain imports are 
relatively small (comparing with its domestic total consumption) and in fact, five out of 
the six years, China was a net grain exporter (Parts A and C, Table 1). Given that soybean 
import is no longer subject to TRQ restrictions, in the rest of the paper, our discussion will 
focus on other grains, i.e., major cereals – wheat, rice and corn.[3] 
China follows a very pragmatic approach to its grain trade, attaching much weight to 
protecting producers’ income and ensuring national food security. China exports or 
imports grains when such a need arises. A quick review of what China did since the early 
1990s will explain this. In the mid-1990s, China’s grain supply was believed to be in 
shortage. The government decided to import grains in large volumes and also took 
measures to promote grain production. Consequently, domestic grain output increased, 
and by the late 1990s and early 2000s, China had accumulated large volumes of grains. As 
part of the response to declining domestic prices, the government encouraged grain export 
(mainly corn, see Part B, Table 1) and China’s net grain export increased during 2002-
2003. Following grain price increases in late 2003 and early 2004, the government 
reduced incentives for grain exports and facilitated grain imports. In 2004, China became 
a net grain importer. During 2004-05 the government also took various measures to boost 
grain production. China’s domestic production increased and in 2005, China again 
became a net grain exporter.  
It is most interesting to note that China exported grains when world market prices were 
below China’s domestic prices. Part C in Table 1 shows that China net exported corn, rice 
and wheat in all the years during 2002-2007 except for wheat in two years, namely, 2004 
and 2005. Examining Figure 3, it is clear that world prices were lower than those in China 
for corn and rice during 2004 and 2007. The picture for wheat was slightly different: 
during mid-2006 and mid-2007, the world price was slightly higher than China’s or 
similar. The world wheat price then soared afterwards. Generally, it would be expected 
that the directions of commodity arbitrage would be from low-priced market to higher-
priced market. This, however, is clearly not the case for China’s corn and rice trade. 
Export subsidy was largely responsible for such unexpected directions of commodity 
movements; this will be further addressed in the nest section. Since early 2008 (in the case 
of wheat, mid-2007), world grain prices turned to be higher, in some months significantly 
higher, than those in China. But China’s grain export was reduced – due to government’s 
serious export control, which will be further addressed in the next section.  
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Sources and notes: International grain prices (in US$) were obtained from World Bank 
Commodity Price. Grain prices in China were based on national average wholesale market 
prices from China  
Agricultural Commodity Price Databank. Monthly average exchange rates between 
Chinese Renminbi yuan and the US dollar were used to convert the international price into 
Chinese yuan.   
Thus, changes in China’s grain imports and exports as elaborated above tend to suggest 
that China’s grain trade is to a greater extent dependent upon its domestic demand and 
supply situations and on its needs for grain security but to a lesser extent influenced by 
WTO accession; at least this was the case for the past few years. As such, it is valuable to 
look into policy issues that affect China’s grain demand and supply conditions which in 
turn affect China’s grain trade practices. 
2.2 Grain Trade Policy 
Our discussion on China’s grain trade policy developments in the past several years is 
mainly focused on the following three aspects: market access, export subsidy, and 
domestic support. 
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2.2.1 Market access 
After WTO accession, TRQs are applied to imports of some agricultural products such as 
grains (wheat, corn and rice), cotton, cooking oil, sugar and wool. The imports of some 
other agricultural products such as soybean, barley, horticultural products and animal 
products are subject to a single tariff rate only. Reduced import tariff rates improved the 
access of foreign agricultural products to the Chinese market. In addition to the tariff rate 
reduction, China also made changes to import procedures of some key agricultural 
products that made exports of such products to China easier. For example, in 2004, wool 
imports were no longer confined to those designated agents but any traders could import 
wool. Prior to 2006, a fixed proportion of cooking oil had to be imported only by state 
trading enterprises (STEs). On 1 January 2006, this proportion was abolished. Thus, it can 
be seen that TRQs are the only means used by China to influence the access of a small 
number of foreign agricultural products, including grains, to the Chinese market. As far as 
grain exports to China are concerned, one can export as much grain as one wishes up to 
the quota to enjoy the very low level of in-quota tariff rates. When the quota is fulfilled, 
one can still export grains to China so long as one is prepared to bear the higher out-quota 
tariff rates. It is interesting to note, however, the utilisation of the grain TRQs in the past 
several years has been low. In 2004, grain import was the highest since WTO accession, 
being 8.02 mt. Yet total grain imports accounted for only 36 per cent of the total quota. 
Details about the TRQ utilisation and why the utilisation is low are given later in this 
paper.  
2.2.2 Export subsidy 
China agreed to abolish all export subsidies at the time of WTO accession. Since 2002, 
two measures were introduced that have had impact on China’s grain exports: tax rebates 
on grain exports and exemption of railway construction levies for grain transportation.  
Tax rebates on grain exports. On 1 January 2002, the State Council approved that a zero 
value-added tax (VAT) would be applied to rice, wheat and corn exports and sales tax 
imposed on these grains exported would be fully refunded (Ministry of Finance and State 
Taxation Bureau 2002). In 2003, the rate of rebates for processed products out of wheat, 
corn and so on was further increased, from 5 per cent to 13 per cent (Ministry of Finance 
and State Taxation Bureau 2003).  It is noted that the use of tax rebates is allowed by 
WTO rules (Chen and Liu 2002). Such rebates increase China’s grain export 
competitiveness in the world market. However, from 20 December 2007, VAT rebates 
were abolished. Further, a temporary grain export tariff was introduced effective from 1 
January to 31 December 2008, ranging between 5% and 25%. Flours of grains could be 
exported only under export quota permit (Ministry of Finance 2007a and 2007b). Changes 
in export support was meant to discourage grain exports so that domestic grain prices 
could be kept low, thus helping curb the rising inflation. In 2008, China’s grain exports 
were reduced dramatically (see Table 1). 
Exemption of railway construction levies for grain transportation. Starting from 1 April 
2002, paddy and rice, wheat and wheat flour, corn and soybean were exempted from 
railway construction levies (State Development and Planning Commission 2002).[4] This 
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exemption was to be terminated by the end of 2005. However, this policy measure is 
currently still in use.[5] This measure significantly reduced the transportation cost of 
grains. According to Wu (2006), the railway construction levy accounts for about 30-40 
per cent of total transportation costs of grains. Its exemption, on average, would have 
reduced rail transportation cost of corn by 40 per cent. This also partly explains why 
China exported grains while domestic prices were higher than those in the world market.  
2.2.3 Domestic support   
To become a member of the WTO, China committed that its domestic support to 
agricultural products would not exceed 8.5 per cent of the value of total agricultural 
production.[6] China used to milk agricultural sector and had a negative support to 
agricultural production (Tian et al. 2002). Consequently, there is so much room for China 
to increase its domestic support level. Nonetheless, its current support level was merely 
0.6 per cent and was far below the level agreed at the WTO accession (Wu 2006). Despite 
the still very low level of domestic support, China indeed continued or initiated some 
measures that would directly or indirectly increase its domestic support to agricultural 
production. 
‘Abolishment of two taxes’ and changes in ‘three agricultural subsidies’. The two taxes 
abolished are ‘agricultural tax’ and ‘taxes on special agricultural products’ (excluding 
tobacco). Three subsidies are ‘direct subsidy to grain production’, ‘subsidy to the adoption 
of improved seeds’, and ‘subsidy to the acquisition of farm machinery’. At the beginning 
of 2006, farmers nationwide were free from paying agricultural tax.[7] Since 2002, 
China’s ‘three agricultural subsidies’ have increased significantly, from 0.1 billion yuan in 
2002 to over 50 billion yuan in 2007 (see Table 2). Such subsidies provided incentives to 
farmers to produce grains and also enhanced China’s grain production capacity.  
Table 2. Agricultural Subsidy in China 2002-07 (b ¥) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Direct subsidy —— —— 11.60 13.20 26.20 42.70 
Improved seeds subsidy 0.10 0.30 2.85 3.87 4.07 6.61 
Farm machine subsidy —— 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.60 2.00 
Total   0.10 0.34 14.52 17.37 30.87 51.31 
Note: — data do not exist or are not available.   
Source: Calculated by authors from publications by the Ministry of Finance (2007). 
Continuation of grain procurement under minimum support prices. In the early 1990s, 
China introduced a minimum support price (MSP) scheme for grain procurement. After 
WTO accession, in order to protect the income of farmers in major grain producing 
regions, this MSP measure was continued, mainly for paddy and wheat. In 2005, the MSP 
was effective for rice. In 2006, the government also procured wheat under MSP. MSP 
provides assurance to grain producers and encourages farmers to produce grains.     
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Assistance to agricultural insurance. In June 2006, agricultural insurance was included as 
part of China’s broad agricultural support system. It was made clear that subsidies would 
be provided to farmers, insurance companies, and agricultural re-insurance efforts. The 
funds would come from both the central and local governments. Through the insurance 
assistance, the government provides indirect support and protection to the farmers. 
Subsidy to agricultural insurance falls into the ‘Green Box’ as allowed by the WTO. 
Many developed countries also make use of such a subsidy as a means to provide support 
to their agricultural production.   
3. China’s Grain TRQs: Implementation and 
Management 
Imports of three major grains, i.e., wheat, rice and corn, are subject to TRQs after China’s 
WTO accession. The tariff rates for in-quota imports are low, being 1 per cent for raw 
grains, and less than 10 per cent for processed grain products. Tariff rates for out-quota 
imports are much higher. The Chinese government promised to make reforms and 
adjustments to grains trade over the following years after the accession in 2001. More 
specifically, proposed major changes include: (1) reduce the out-quota tariff rates for 
grains subject to TRQs (from 74 per cent in 2001 to 65 per cent in 2004); (2) increase 
TRQs (for wheat, corn and rice, from 8.468 mt, 5.85 mt and 3.99 mt in 2002 to 9.636 mt, 
7.2 mt and 5.32 mt in 2004, respectively); and (3) reduce the proportion of corn imports 
designated to STEs and increase the proportion to be traded by other participants. Details 
of proposed changes in out-quota tariff rates and the proportion designated to STEs can be 
found in Table 3. 
3.1 Grain TRQ Allocation [8] 
In China, the management of agricultural import TRQs is carried out by different 
government departments according to their administrative roles. For example, grain TRQs 
are managed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which also 
manages cotton TRQs. TRQs of vegetable cooking oils, sugar and wool are managed by 
the Ministry of Commerce. Highlighted below are general management issues concerning 
the application, allocation and re-distribution of grain TRQs.  
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Table 3. STE Trading Proportions and In-quota and Out-quota Tariff Rates 







Description HS Code 







Durum wheat 10011000 74 65 1 
Seed 10019010 74 65 1 
Other  10019090 74 65 1 
Wheat or meslin flour 11010000 74 65 6 
Groats and meal 11031100 74 65 9 
Wheat 90% 
Pellets 11032100 74 65 10 
Seed 10051000 32 20 1 
Other 10059000 74 65 1 
Flour 11022000 64 40 9 
Groats and meal 11031300 74 65 9 
Corn 71% in 2001, 
68% in 2002, 
64% in 2003, 
60% in 2004 
Cereal grains 
otherwise worked 11042300 74 65 10 
Seed 10061010 74 65 1 
Other 10061090 74 65   
Husked (brown) rice 10062000 74 65 1 
Semi-milled or 
wholly milled rice, 
whether or not 
polished or glazed 
10063000 74 65 1 
Broken rice 10064000 74 65 1 




Groats and meal 11031400 28 10 9 
Source: Based on WTO (2001), Agreement of Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
The NDRC predicts the amount of imports required in a calendar year and submits a 
request to the State Council. After the approval by the State Council, the NDRC is in a 
position to distribute the import quotas among traders including STEs. China’s WTO 
agreement allows China’s STEs to import grains under the TRQ arrangement at a pre-
determined proportion (see Table 3). Currently the STE that is designated to handle TRQ 
imports of grain is COFCO Limited. It has the privilege to be allocated a certain portion 
of the total grain import TRQs from the NDRC. The remaining TRQs are distributed to 
other traders according to the following general principle and approach. (1) If the 
remaining amount of TRQs is greater than the amount requested, all traders eligible for 
applying for a TRQ are allocated the amount they applied for. (2) If the amount is smaller 
than the total amount requested, then those who have grain import experience are 
 34
allocated the TRQs first. The leftover is then distributed among those who have not 
previously imported grains.  
Non-STE traders need to apply to the agents of the NRDC scattered in various provinces 
between 15 and 30 October each year for an import quota for the next calendar year. The 
NRDC then determines the amount to be granted based on the approach described above 
(i.e., trader’s past import performance, trader’s grain processing capacities, with reference 
to various other commercial considerations). After the amount is determined, the NDRC, 
through its agents, issues an ‘agricultural import TRQ permit’ to a trader no later than 31 
December of the current year for imports in the next calendar year. The TRQs must be 
utilised by the traders within a calendar year. If the imports have departed the origin port 
before 31 December but can only arrive at a port in China sometime in the next calendar 
year, the trader must apply for an extension. The extension, however, is generally not 
beyond the end of February of the next calendar year.    
If a trader cannot utilise all the allocated TRQs, the unused TRQs must be returned to the 
NDRC before 15 September. The returned TRQs will be redistributed. Application for 
redistributed TRQs takes place between 1 and 15 September. Returned TRQs are 
redistributed to traders according to the order of their applications submitted. Before 1 
October, the NDRC informs the traders of the results of their application for extra TRQs 
through redistribution.    
Hence, the initial procedure used by China to distribute the grain TRQs after its WTO 
accession may be shown as below: 
 
This procedure is troublesome for traders. If a trader managed to secure a contract with a 
foreign supplier but then the TRQ import permit is not granted or not granted in full for 
the amount specified in the contract, the traders cannot make the purchase, leaving both 
the trader and supplier in difficult situation. In 2003, modifications were made to make the 
procedure simpler and taking less time to obtain a permit. The simplified procedure is 
shown below and it has made it much easier for traders to conduct their businesses.  
 
It is noted, however, the quota granted to private traders tends to be too small in many 
cases. This makes it less commercially worthwhile for private traders to make use of the 
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quota. Such small amounts of quotas are often returned for reallocation, which in turn 
often falls into the hands of STEs. 
3.2 Grain TRQ Utilisation 
China’s grain TRQ utilisation has been low since its WTO accession although its 
utilisation of the TRQs for some other agricultural products has increased and has reached 
a relatively high level. For example, during 2002-2005, the TRQ usage of sugar, soybean 
oil and wool exceeded 60 per cent (Han 2005). According to official statistics, the actual 
imports of palm oil more than doubled the TRQ amount. The imports of cotton were also 
1.6 times of the TRQ amount. On the other hand, the grain TRQ utilisation has been 
relatively low and the average utilisation was only about 12 per cent during 2002-07. At 
the product level, the average utilisation of wheat TRQ during the same time period was 
slightly higher, being 22 per cent, while that of rice and corn is 10 per cent and 0.3 per 
cent, respectively.[9] During the first six months in 2008, the TRQ usage remained to be 
very low.  Table 4 provides details of the TRQ usage during 2002-2008.  
Table 4. Grain Tariff-Rate Quotas and Actual Imports, 2002-08 (’000 t) 
    Wheat  Corn  Rice  Total or Average
TRQ 8468 5850 3990 18308 
Import  605 6 236 847 2002 
Usage (%) 7.1 0.1 5.9 4.6 
TRQ 9052 6525 4655 20232 
Import  424 0 257 681 2003 
Usage (%) 4.7 0.0 5.5 3.4 
TRQ 9636 7200 5320 22156 
Import  7258 2 766 8026 2004 
Usage (%) 75.3 0.0 14.4 36.2 
TRQ 9636 7200 5320 22156 
Import  3539 4 522 4065 2005 
Usage (%) 36.7 0.1 9.8 18.3 
TRQ 9636 7200 5320 22156 
Import  613 65 730 1408 2006  
Usage (%) 6.4 0.9 13.7 6.4 
TRQ 9636 7200 5320 22156 
Import  101 35 487 623 2007 
Usage (%) 1.1 0.5 9.2 2.8 
TRQ 9636 7200 5320 22156 
Import  3.3 1.9 209 214.2 
2008 
(1-6)  Usage (%) 0.0 0.0 3.9 1.0 
Sources: Based on WTO (2001), Agreement of Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China, and MOA (2008), Statistical Information. 
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Table 5 shows the sources of grains imported under the TRQ arrangement. Canada, 
Australia, France and the U.S. are the major sources of wheat imports. Corn chiefly comes 
from the U.S. and Laos. Thailand is the major source of rice imports. Apart from those 
designated STEs, those who imported grains are mainly some large grain processors or 
traders located in cities along China’s southeast coast. In terms of the usage of imported 
grains, higher protein wheat imported from Canada and the U.S. is chiefly used for bread 
production while wheat with lower protein content from Australia is primarily used to 
produce biscuits and other processed foods. Rice and corn are also used for industrial 
purposes or food processing.  
Table 5. Major Sources of Grain Imports (%), 2004-07 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Wheat 61.0% 85.5% 96.6% 88.8% 
Canada 34.9 41.0 15.5 44.8 
Australia 24.6 28.6 50.2 26.7 
France 1.4 15.9     
USA     30.9 17.3 
Corn 25.7% 67.0% 99.5% 99.4% 
USA 25.7 17.8 90.5 10.9 
Laos   47.1 7.5 45.9 
Burma     1.4 42.6 
India   1.1 0.1   
Rice 96.5% 99.9% 100.0% 99.8% 
Thailand 96.1 91.9 94.5 93.5 
Vietnam 0.4 8.0 4.9 5.4 
Burma   0.1     
Laos     0.6 0.9 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Monthly Bulletin of Chinese Agricultural Import and 
Export Statistics. 
4. Factors Affecting Grain TRQ Utilisation   
According to Table 4, the utilisation of the grains TRQs has been relatively low since 
China’s accession to the WTO. The rates of utilisation also differ significantly among the 
three major grains, namely, wheat, rice and corn. In principle, restrictions imposed by 
TRQs on imports depend on the out-quote tariff rates specified. If trading parties are 
willing to trade at the out-quota tariff rates, then imports are not restricted by TRQs. Since 
the out-quota tariff rates are generally very high, under normal circumstances, trading 
does not take place at the out-quota tariff rates. However, in the past seven years there was 
no need for China to import grains at the out-quota tariff rates, since a large portion of the 
grain TRQs had not been utilised. Then, what are the major factors that led to China’s low 
utilisation of grain TRQs?   
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Increased support for domestic grain production reduces the need for imports. To a great 
extent, domestic grain demand and supply situations dictate a country’s grains trade. 
Increased incentives to farmers for greater production improved China’s domestic supply, 
which in turn has led to reduced needs for imports. Discussion in the earlier section 
clearly shows that China’s domestic support to grain production has been on the increase 
since its WTO accession, particularly after 2003 when China experienced another major 
reduction in grain output and the subsequent price increases in the grain market. China’s 
improved supplies from domestic production have been the major reason responsible for 
the low utilisation of the grain TRQs. 
Higher quality grains produced domestically substitute imports. In the past, small-scale 
farm production coupled with inadequate grain marketing facilities made it very difficult 
for China to produce grains of the desired quality at the desired quantity for specific 
usages (Zhou and Tian 2006). First, the quality of grains varies from farm to farm. 
Second, grains of better quality are often not handled separately, due to either lack of 
facilities or the small quantity. As a result, China often imports grains, especially wheat, 
of high quality for some special usages. Recently, more attention has been given to the 
production of higher quality grains through some innovative arrangements between food-
processing firms and farms (such as ‘ding dan nong ye’ – a kind of contract farming, 
under such arrangements firms usually provide farmers with technical assistance to 
produce wheat with desired attributes) (Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 2003).  
Grain export incentives encouraged export. As pointed out earlier, after WTO accession, 
grain exports attract a zero value-added tax. Sales tax on grains exported would be fully 
refunded. Further, no railway construction levies would be imposed on grain transported 
which can reduce rail transportation cost by about 40 per cent. The combination of such 
incentives made it still possible for China to export grains (chiefly, corn) at the world 
prices that were lower than China’s domestic prices. China exported a large amount of 
corn during 2002-07 (about 47 mt) and its corn TRQ usage is almost zero (see Table 4). 
Transaction costs make imports less attractive. Despite the fact that the world grain prices 
were lower than China’s during most of the times between 2002 and 2007, imported 
grains have to bear extra transaction costs, including, for example, transportation, in-quota 
tariff, VAT. Higher costs translate into higher prices, leading to reduced demand for 
imported grains. It is noted that China collects a 13 per cent VAT on import. Hence, even 
if the nominal tariff rates are reduced to zero, this import VAT can still effectively 
dampen down the price competitiveness of imported grains.  
TRQ allocation and implementation methods limit grain imports. Grain TRQs are first 
divided between STEs and non-STE traders. A large portion of the TRQs is assigned to 
STEs. If STEs cannot use up all the assigned TRQs, with the approval by the NDRC, the 
unused TRQs will be allocated to non-STE traders. However, private traders may not have 
sufficient time to organise such imports before the end of the allowed time. Also, 
procedures used by the Chinese government to allocate the TRQs to private traders can 
impede grain imports. As pointed out earlier in this section, the allocation and re-
distribution of TRQs to non-STE traders, though largely reasonable, could sometimes lead 
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to difficulties in grain imports. Recently, the government has made efforts to improving 
the TRQ administration.  
According to the above, China’s very low-level usage of the grain TRQs is chiefly due to 
its domestic supply-demand situations. Its grain production and subsidy policies 
encouraged domestic production and also industrial adjustments to produce grains to meet 
market demand. Export incentives encouraged grain exports while the implementation of 
grain TRQs was not always conducive to grain imports. Will China be able to maintain 
such a low level of grain imports into the near future? This largely depends upon its 
domestic grain supply-demand situations and the outcomes of its bilateral and multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
5. China’s Grain Trade and Policy Prospects  
China’s fast economic growth in the past three decades has led to the rapid expansion of 
non-agricultural sectors, resulting in a continuous decline in the proportion of agricultural 
GDP out of total GDP. In 1978, when China’s economic reform started, agricultural GDP 
accounted for 28.2 per cent of total GDP. This proportion, however, had dropped to 15.2 
per cent by 2001 and has further drooped to 11.3 per cent by 2007 (NBS 2008, p. 21). 
Many agricultural activities are likely to further lose their comparative advantage as the 
economic returns of non-agricultural activities continue to improve. Declining 
comparative advantages in agriculture lead to resources deviated to non-agricultural uses, 
such as water and land. Without the advent of significant technological breakthrough 
(such as effective yield-augmenting measures), it will be difficult for China’s agricultural 
sector to further increase its output. On the other hand, with improved purchasing power, 
consumers’ demand for agricultural products, especially higher quality products, has been 
increasing and will continue to do so into the future.  
As far as grain is concerned, grain production is land intensive. The production of some 
grain crops is rapidly losing their comparative advantages (e.g., rice production in 
southeast coastal regions). As a result, farmers shift their resources to other economic 
activities (Zhou and Tian 2006). For example, total area sown to grain crops declined 
from 106.1 million ha. in 2001 to 99.4 million ha. in 2003; the area increased to 105.6 
million ha. by 2007 due to strong government incentives to grow grain (NBS 2008, p. 
119). However, China’s demand for grains is still increasing – although direct 
consumption has declined, indirect consumption of grains has been increasing due to 
increased demand for animal products and for processed food. According to Zhou and 
Tian (2003), China’s demand for feedgrains has been increasing and will become the 
major component of China’s total grain demand. Any future increase in total grain 
demand in China will be mainly caused by an increasing demand for feedgrains. On the 
other hand, many believe that China will not be able to meet the increased demand for 
grains in general and feedgrains in particular with its domestic supply (Garnaut and Ma 
1992; RGCFDS 1993; Crook and Colby 1996; Findlay 1998; Tian and Chudleigh 1999; 
Chen 2004; and Zhou and Tian 2005). There are two broad approaches China can use to 
increase its total grain supply: (1) to further increase domestic supply, and (2) to increase 
grain imports. 
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The potential of the first option is limited as has been pointed out due to the declining 
comparative advantage of grain production. Likely future changes in resource allocation 
and pricing (e.g., deviation of land, labour force, and water away from agriculture, and 
possible charges on water use) will further erode China’s comparative advantage in grain 
production. Should China insist to increase grain supply from domestic production to 
meet the increasing demand, the cost, both economically and environmentally, can be 
large. Hence, increasing grain imports is likely to be the chief method for China to 
increase its total grain supply to match the rising demand. 
Although China’s future grain imports are expected to increase (Chen 2004; Zhou and 
Tian 2005), policies regarding market access are unlikely to have significant changes in 
the immediate future. As a result of the failure of the Doha Round, it is to China’s 
advantage to maintain the current market access policies unchanged unless China needs to 
significantly increase its grain imports. Any major changes in market access policies will 
also depend upon the progress and outcomes of multilateral and bilateral trade 
negotiations. In regard to multilateral negotiations, the recent WTO meetings such as the 
Delhi meeting have not significantly revived the negotiation process. When negotiations 
do get restarted, WTO members with major grain exports may press China to further open 
its grain market. They are likely to pay more attention to the allocation and management 
of the grain TRQs if the grain TRQs are continued. 
China has become increasingly engaged in bilateral trade negotiations in recent years, for 
example, with ASEAN, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. The negotiations 
with ASEAN and Chile have been concluded. China-ASEAN FTA was put into practice 
on 20 July 2005 while the implementation of China-Chile FTA was started on 1 October 
2006. Cereal exports to China from these countries will enjoy reduced tariffs. It seems that 
it is a very wise strategic choice, through bilateral FTAs, for China to maintain close 
economic and trade relationships with some key grain-exporting countries. This will 
enable China to secure a relatively diverse source of grain suppliers and will help China to 
establish a stable source of grain supply. This can be a very important strategy that will 
help China to achieve its long-term national grain security.  
However, some argued that increased trade liberalisation does not necessarily ensure 
China’s rural development and increase farmers’ income (Shui 2006). Currently, raising 
farmers’ income, protecting rural employment, and reducing rural poverty are major 
challenges faced by the Chinese government. Grain production remains a major source of 
income for many small Chinese farms and China may have to rely on this industry to 
provide the livelihood for many Chinese farmers for some years to come. Thus, it may be 
anticipated that China can be very sensitive in regard to the level of access for imported 
grains to the Chinese market. Nonetheless, in future negotiations, trading partners are 
most likely to ask China to further open its grain market. Further, there are the needs for 
China to import more grains. Consequently, the Chinese government may at times adjust 
its grain trade policies, either voluntarily or passively. However, any major such 
adjustments would be still based chiefly on changes in China’s domestic grain demand 
and supply situations. In the near future, China is unlikely to be in need for large amounts 
of grain imports. Indeed, it is anticipated that China’s grain exports in 2009 will increase. 
The following changes will lead to increased exports. (1) China had a good grain harvest 
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in 2008. (2) The government has announced that the 2009 minimum support price for 
wheat will be increased by 11-13 per cent. The 2009 minimum support price for rice will 
also be increased to a large extent (NDRC 2008). Higher MSPs will further boost output 
level in 2009. (3) Effective from 1 December 2008 till 31 December 2009, grain export 
tariffs will be either completely lifted (e.g., corn) or significantly reduced (State Council 
2008).  
6. Conclusions and Implications    
Since China’s WTO accession, there have been some notable adjustments in China’s grain 
trade policies. Domestic subsidy has evolved from providing chiefly price support to both 
price and income support. Such support has increased rapidly in the past seven years in 
order to promote domestic grain production. China also increased its support for grain 
exports with increased emphasis given to encourage the export of processed grain 
products. In terms of market access, China has done well to honour its WTO accession 
commitments and TRQ is the only means used by China to influence the access of grain 
imports to the Chinese market. 
A relatively high proportion of the grain TRQs is traded by STEs and the management of 
the non-STE portion of the TRQs is still not very transparent, though the government has 
tried to make improvements. Hence, the use of grain TRQs has to some extent limited the 
imports of grains to China. However, TRQ is only one of the several major factors that 
have contributed to the low usage of the grain TRQs. Other major factors include: 
increased domestic grain production support and thus increased output, and improved 
availability of higher quality grains produced domestically.  
Although it was low in the past years, the TRQ usage is likely to increase in the future. It 
is generally held that China will need to increase its grain imports. In future trade 
negotiations China may agree to further open up its grain market but may attach 
conditions such as asking for further opening up of labour intensive product markets by its 
trading partners. China may also relate its grain and other agricultural product markets 
opening up to the international movement of production factors such as capital, 
technology, and labour.  
However, in the near future, it is unlikely that the Chinese government will bring 
significant changes to the current grain trade policies, unless there are drastic progresses 
with the WTO multilateral trade negotiations or large unexpected changes in domestic 
grain supply. Government support to encourage grain production is expected to continue 
and is likely to further increase. It is not anticipated that export support will increase 
significantly unless there is a temporary glut in domestic production and China needs to 
export badly. Whether foreign grains will have improved access to the Chinese market 
will depend on China’s domestic supply and demand; however, trading partners having a 
bilateral FTA with China are expected to have improved access to the Chinese grain 
market. TRQs will continue to be used by China as its only major means to control grain 
imports to China. Any changes in the amount of TRQs, the management of TRQs, and the 
out-quota tariff rates, will be primarily influenced by China’s domestic grain supply and 
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also to a great extent by the progress and outcomes of multilateral and bilateral trade 
negotiations.  
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[1].          For example, Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and Grains Research and Development 
Corporation (GRDC) commissioned researchers at ANU to look into the dynamics of China’s 
wheat market and trade soon after its WTO accession and the report emphasised the importance 
to understand China’s grain TRQ issues (AWB and GRDC 2005)   
[2].          Grain in China includes cereals (rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, millet and other 
miscellaneous grains), tuber crops (sweet potatoes and potatoes only, not including taro and 
cassava), as well as pulses (including mainly soybeans, red bean, and mung bean). The output of 
tuber crops (sweet potatoes and potatoes) was converted on a 4:1 ratio, i.e., four kilograms of 
fresh tubers were equivalent to one kilogram of grain, up to 1963. Since 1964, the ratio has been 
5:1. The output of beans refers to dry beans without pods. The term “grain” generally includes all 
these “grains” unless otherwise indicated.  
[3].          Soybean has been one of the major grains in China’s international grain trade. As early 
as in 1996, China started to apply a tariff-rate quota to soybean imports, with an in-quote tariff 
being 3 per cent, a preferential tariff 40 per cent and an ordinary tariff 180 per cent. During the 
WTO entry negotiations, China agreed to remove soybean import TRQ and also to reduce 
soybean import tariffs significantly to be 3 per cent only. For soybean powder, the tariff is 5 per 
cent. China also agreed that by 2006 soybean oil import TRQ would be removed and the import 
would be only subject to a 9 per cent tariff. 
[4].          In 2003, State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) was renamed as National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  
[5].          In September 2007, it was stipulated by an NDRC notice that exemption of railway 
construction levies will be continued for grain transportation except for grains transported by 
railway from northeast China to other parts of China, in which case, an ¥18 per tonne would be 
collected from 10 October 2007 (NDRC 2007).   
[6].          Currently developed countries are allowed a minimal amount of Amber Box support (“de 
minimis”). For support that is not given to specific products, this is defined as 5 per cent of the 
value of total agricultural production. For support given to a specific product, the limit is 5 per cent 
of production of that product. Developing countries are allowed up to 10 per cent of these. The 
framework says de minimis will be reduced by an amount to be negotiated, with special treatment 
for developing countries, which will be exempt if they “allocate almost all de minimis support for 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers” WTO (2007).  
[7].          In March 2004, China’s Premier, Wen Jiabao, pointed out that agricultural tax rate would 
be gradually reduced and agricultural tax should be completely phased out within five years (Wen 
2004). By early 2006, agricultural tax disappeared nationwide. This enabled farmers to retain extra 
income, which has an important impact on production and livelihood of farmers in poorer regions. 
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 46
[8].          Much of the discussion in this section is based on a joint notice by the Ministry of 
Commerce and the National Development and Reform Commission (2003), ‘Temporary 
management procedures of agricultural import TRQs’, Notice No. 34, 2003, and descriptions in 
WTO (2001), Agreement of Accession of the People’s Republic of China. 
[9].          As a result of price changes in domestic grain market in 2003 and 2004, the utilisation 
rate of wheat TRQ increased in 2004, reaching 75.3 per cent. Rice TRQ usage was also higher, 
being 14.4 per cent in 2004. 
 
